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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
A CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,
vs.

No. 3649

PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH, AND UTAH
POWER & LIGHT COMPANY,

CERTIORARI
PROCEEDINGS

f, CORPORATION,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

The Power Company's "Additional Brief" deals only
with the one contention respecting the retroactive
feature of the order in Case 248. This is, therefore, all
that we will discuss herein.
THE QUESTION IS NOT RES JUDICATA.
The Power Co. urges that the decision of this Court
in Case 230 is res judicata, on the theory that it was
expressly passed upon by this Court, or, if not, was
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at least inferentially passed upon by the general affirmance of the order in Case 230. The question certainly
was not expressly passed upon. The opinion of the
Court did not even mention, much less discuss, the
effect of the provisions of Sections 4785, 4800 and
4830, C. L. 1917. Not only did the decision of the
Court fail to expressly pass upon this question, but,
on the contrary, this Court, upon the petition for the
rehearing, stated the question accurately by saying
that it was whether or not the Commission had the
power to make or enforce the temporary rates; and the
Court then expressly and unequivocally said that "that
question was not, nor was it intended to be, decided
in any of those cases."
The Power Co. says that the Court knows what it
intended to decide and did decide, and adds that it is
perhaps presumptious to argue to the Court which
rendered a decision, what was decided thereby. It
need only be said that the Court rendered its decision
in the English language, and litigants have a right
to accept and rely upon the express, unambiguous and
unequivocal language of the Court saying that it did
not decide, nor intend to decide, the question raised.
The Power Co. urges that the question was inferentially necessarily decided by the general affirmance
of the order in Case 230, on the theory that the principle
involved lay at the foundation of the order in Case
230. · In making its order in Case 230, the Commission,
under the statute as construed by this Court, was
authorized to interfere with the contract. That it did.
It was then authorized, and under the statute it was its
duty, to find and declare the reasonable rate to be
paid by the consumer. That it did not do. Frankness
demands that we state that we regarded those two
powers of the Commission and those two duties of the
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Commission as interlocking, and therefore we made a specific attack upon the order in Case 230 for its omission to
find and declare the reasonable rate as required by
the statute. We thought that the Court should and
would pass upon that question with respect to the
order in Case 230. However, the Court did not do
so, and expressly says that it did not do so, and expressly
says that it did not intend to do so. The only explanation
for the Court's attitude towards this question is that it
regarded the order in Case 230, insofar as it dealt with
this rate feature, as possibly only an interlocutory order
and not a final order, and that the question could best
be dealt with and determined when the Commission had
finally acted vvith respect to rates by making its order
in Case 248. Accordingly, when we came to review the
orc1er in Case 248, we renewed the question.
Tl:e Copper Co. had a right to have that question
exp<:>essly passed upon. It had a right to have it revicY,"Cd in connection with the order in Case 230. It
hac; ?, ri.<rht to have it reviewed in connection with
the ordrr in ~ase 248. The question is not a mere
technical one; it is a substantial one involving practically a quarter of a million dollars. The Copper Co. has
done everything prescribed by procedural or remedial
law to protect itself with respect to the question raised.
Now the Power Co. seeks, on the technical doctrine
of res judicata, to forever , prevent the Court from
passing upon the question, simply because the Court
declined to pass upon it in reviewing the order in
Case No. 230. Such a result would be intolerable.
Whether it would be good J::\w is for this Court to say;
but certainly it would not be justice or fair play. When
a litigant raiseR a qneEd:ion and attempts to have it determined, and the Court expressly declines to determine
it, there is no justice or fairness in refusing to again
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entertain the question when again presented, in a new
proceeding, against a new order, and put that refusal
on the ground that the question had already been determined inferentially, despite the Court's express statement that the question had not been determined.
The Power Co. says that the effect of the Court's
now entertaining this question and deciding it in favor
of the Copper Co., would be to leave the customer
in the position of being required to pay Schedule 43
rates, and that, therefore, we are seeking to review
a portion of the order "which is of benefit to the
customer." We hardly see wherein an order which
takes a quarter of a million dollars illegally is a benefit
to the Copper Co. Aside from this, the suggestion
of the Power Co. is untenable, not only because Schedule
43 rates have been declared unreasonable, but also
because if the Copper Company's position on the merits
of the question presented is sound, then the Copper
Co. would only be required to pay the contract rnte
up to the time that the Commission established the
new reasonable rate. This destroys the sophistical suggestion that the order is of any benefit to the Copper
Co. Furthermore, this suggestion bears upon the merits
of the question, and not upon the point of res ju,dioota.
It will not do to confound the two propositions. The
Court cannot decline to entertain the question on the
theory of res j'ndicatn because of any view it may hold
or not hold respecting the merits of the question.
In 23 Cyc. 1226, it is said that
res judicata:

a

judgment to be

"Should be free from irreconcilable contradictions and ambiguities which cannot be cleared
away."
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And in 23 Cyc. 1292, it is said that:
"The estoppel cannot be extended to matters
which the judgment expressly declares not to
have been in issue in the action in which it was
rendered or to have been omitted from consideration therein."
And in 23 Cyc. 1297, it is said:
"The estoppel of a judgment does not extend
to matters not expressly adjudicated and which
can only be inferred by argument or construction from the judgment."
In 15 R. C. L. 955, it is said:
"If the real merits of the suit are not determined in the prior decision, the judgment will
not be a bar."

In 15 R. C. L. 980, it is said that a plea of res
.iud1:cata is insufficient, unless it appears that the issue
or qr;estion was:
"Positively decided in such former
against the present plaintiff."

action

The plea of res judicata should not be sustained in
this case. The issues are not identical. A new order
is here under review and it brings before the Court
facts which did not exist at the time the original or
foundational order was entered.
The question presented was expressly withdrawn and
withheld by the Court in passing upon the order in
Case 230. The Court's opinion on the application for
rehearing as to the former order expressly states that
this question was omitted from consideration therein.
The real merits of the question were not decided, nor
vv-ere they intended to be decided, by the judgment as
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to the other order. The question is one which in effect
was expressly reserved by the Court's opinion in the
former case. The question is now open. The Copper
Go. should not be hurt by any act of the law. The
Court should pass upon the question raised. It did
not do so in the former case. It should do so in this
case to the end that somewhere, somehow, the rights
of the Copper Co. with respect to this matter may be
determined. A gross wrong has been done the Copper
Co. For every wrong, the law provides a remedy. The
pending proceeding affords that remedy.
REPLY ARGUMENT ON THE MERITS.
The Power Co. says Schedule 43 rates would have been
applicable to the Copper Company's service but for
the contract. It urges that this is evidenced by the
fact that for 8000 H. P. in excess of the 31000 H. P.
covered by the contract, the Copper Co. paid at Schedule
43 rates. That has nothing to do with this case. The
question here involves only the rate for the 31000 H. P.
for which there was a contract. Of course, after the
Utilities Act was passed and the schedules filed, the
schedule rates had to apply to service not embraced
within a pre-existing contract. But that does not
destroy the express requirement of our statute that as
to service embraced in a pre-existing contract the Commission, upon interfering with such contract, should find
and prescribe the reasonable rates to be thereafter
observed. It is certainly astounding to contemplate
the omnipotence of the Power Co. By merely filing a
piece of paper it has succeeded in striking down constitutional limitations, and wiping out a clause of the
statute, and now seeks to induce the Court to ignore
three more express requirements of the statute.
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The Power Co. next attempts to excuse the failure
of Schedule 43 to carry any symbol denoting any
advance in rates as required by the Commission's
Tariff Circular No. 3. It seeks so to do because that
schedule recited that it was effective on March 1, 1917,
and therefore the Power Co. says it was filed previously
to the issuance of that Tariff Circular. There are two
answers to this, viz. : ( 1) the uncontradicted fact
shown by the certiorari record in Case No. 3582, in
this Court, at page 8, is that the schedule was not
filed until after the circular, although the Power Co.
had had such an unfiled schedule previously; and (2)
circular, or no circular, the schedule was not filed until
after the passage of the statute, and the statute itself
(Sec. 4785) required that attention be directed to any
rate advance by an appropriate symbol. All this argument of the Power Co. is shown in its true light, when
Y'e remember the fact that the schedule was not
rlef,i gned to increase contract rates, not only because
the Power Co. had no right to ignore its contracts,
but also because it continued billing at the contract
rates and not schedule rates for over two years before
the Commission started the investigation. The Court
can feel reasonably sure that the Power Co. would
have billed on the schedule if it felt that such schedule
was designed to, or operated to, affect the contract
service rate.
The Power Co. says it was impossible to make the
special contracts conform to that rate advance requirement. That is another suggestion thrown in to cloud
the proposition. The question is whether the schedule
rate affected the contracts. The schedule had to
measure up to certain requirements to effect such a
result. It did not do so. There was no requirement
that any contract should carry any such symbol.
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In the last place, the Power Co. says that this provision, designed to give the public notice of rate
advances, should be treated by the Court as merely
directory and not mandatory, and therefore the failure
of the schedule to comply with the statute is to be
disregarded as a mere irregularity. This merits no
answer.
The Power Co. refers to the opinion of Mr. Justice
Gideon as destroying the contracts. That was not the
opinion of a majority of the Court. Furthermore,
that opinion overlooks the distinction between contracts
made prior to the pP.ssage of the Act, and those made
subsequently. That is certainly a reasonable basis for
classification. It is passing strange to say that obedience to a constitutional mandate against the impairment of pre-existing contracts renders a statute unconstitutional for improper classification.
The Power Co. says the contention is technical and
subversive of justice. Of course, in their view anything
is technical which requires either the Power Co. or
the Commission to comply with the mandate of the
statute. True, if the Commission had declared Schedule 43 rates reasonable, or had fixed new rates
in its October order, this question could not have
arisen. But the "mummery of words" the Power
Co. complains of happens to be a statutory requirement.
To follow a statutory mandate may
be regarded as "archaic legal procedure," in these
modern days when we have passed from the divine
right of kings to the divine right of majorities; but
after all, the statute is the voice of those majorities,
and this requirement of the statute was put in there
so that the consumers might know in advance the
exact rate they would be called upon to pay. The Commission never found Schedule 43 rates reasonable as
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applied to our service. On the contrary, it foun·d them
unreasonable. The "spirit of the Act," and "justice
and equity" (as viewed by the courts rendering the
decisions cited on pages 15 and 16 of our main brief
herein) demanded that the agreed rate should be the
only lawful rate until the Commission found and
declared a new reasonable rate, in accordance with the
statute.
The Power Co. next contends that the order of the
Commission in Case 230 making the schedule rate
applicable to the service, was equivalent to an approval
of those rates and to a finding of their reasonableness.
That is not true because that very order said that
question had not been determined and ordered the
Power Co. to stand ready to make reparation; and
ultimately those rates were found unreasonable and
reduced. So the Commission never approved Schedule
43 rates and never found them reasonable as applied
to this contract service.
The Power Co. says it was the right and duty of the
Commissinn to fix temporary rates for this contract
service pending its completion of the investigation
and establishment of the reasonable rate, and cites
Fort Smith & W.' R. Co. v. State, and Muskogee Gas. &
E. Co. v. State, and Omaha & C. B. St. R. v. Commission.
Those cases are not in point. In none of them was a
statutory provision involved such as we have here.
In none of them was any pre-existing contract involved.
The first case merely held that there was sufficient
evidence to justify attaching a prim,a facie validity to
an order condemning a schedule rate. The second case
merely held that the Commission could, upon proper
evidence, fix temporary rates to meet war emergencies,
without making a technical valuation of the utility's
property. That has nothing to do with the question
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here presented. The third case is to exactly the same
effect, and has no bearing here. The Commission
in Case 248 promulgated these new rates as temporary
emergency rates pending a valuation of the Power
Company's property. If we were attacking those rates
on the theory that a valuation was a condition precedent to fixing the rates, those decisions would be directly
in point. But obviously that is not the question here
presented. No such statutory requirement, on a contract case, such as we are here dealing with, was
involved in any of those decisions cited by the Power Co.
The Power Co. also contends that the fact that a
tariff rate is under attack as unreasonable gives a
consumer no right to a different rate pending the
determination of such attack, and the ascertainment
of the reasonable rate, and cites Suburban Water Cc.
v. Oakmont, and Texas & P. Ry. v·. Abilene Oil Co.
That proposition and those cases have no relevancy
to the question here at issue. The first of those cases
merely presented a situation where a tariff rate was in
effect, and a patron, without any contract, sought
service, but contended that the schedule rate was
unreasonably high. He took the service and declined
to pay the bill. It was merely held that he had to
pay the bill and seek reparation through the Commission. That case has nothing to do with the question
here involved. This is a different situation under a
specific and different statutory provision. The second
case cited by the Power Co. merely held that a state
court had no jurisdiction to declare an interstate freight
rate unreasonable, as that issue lay with the Interstate Commerce Commission in the first instance. What
that has to do with the question here presented is
beyond our comprehension. So the Kinn;avey case
merely determined what was necessary, under the Act
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to Regulate Commerce, to l).ttack an interstate rate as
unreasonable. That case has no bearing on this one.
The Power Co. also contends that the schedule rates
were the only lawful rates "except as any customer
may have been entitled to a different rate by virtue
of a preserved special contract," and cites Boston Ry. v.
Hooker, Louisville Ry. v. Maxwell, Louisville Ry. v.
Dickerson, and Poor Grain Co. v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Every
one of those cases can be disregarded as not in point.
They arose under the Federal Act. No such statutory
provision as we have here was there involved. There
is not the slightest analogy in the facts. The Hooker
case merely involved the validity of a limitation for
loss of baggage. The Maxwell case and the Poor Grain
Co. case merely hold that where there is an existing
tariff freight rate, a shipper~ must pay that rate, even
though a station agent makes a mistake in naming
a lower rate in issuing the bill-of-lading. The Dickersr:?? c::~sc iR to exactly the same effect, except that
then: the bill--of-lading named too high a rate, and the
shipper recovered the excess. In none of those cases
was any pre-existing contract involved. In none of them
was there any statutory requirement such as we have
here involved. In State v. Billings Co., cited by the
Power Co., no such statutory provision was involved as
we have here. There the Commission was not required
to do anything.
The Power Co. says that our contention ignores the
provision prohibiting any contract differing from published schedules and making the schedule rates the
conclusive lawful rates. That argmnent is sound as
to all contracts entered into since the passage of the
Act and the filing of the schedule's, but not as to
pre-existing contracts. The statute makes the rates
in antecedent contracts the only lawful rates until
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the Commission sets aside the contract and establishes
a new reasonable rate to be thereafter observed, in
accordance with the statute.
The Power Co. admits that the Commission must
follow the statute in increasing any schedule rate.
It admits that the Commission "must follow the method
prescribed by the statute in its actions in this respect."
All we say is that the Commission, in increasing a
contract rate, fixed by a pre-existing contract, "must
follow the method prescribed by the statute."
The Power Go. says that "the error" in 0 1.1r position
is "in the assumption that both the schedule and
contract rates are entitled to equal presumptions of
lawfulness." There is no error. The statute preserved
the rates named in pre~existing contracts until the
Commission not only set aside the contract, but also,
as required by the statute, found and fixed the reasonable rates to be thereafter observed.
The authorities cited in our main brief are directly
in point. They deserve most careful consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Plaintiff.

